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claim because the record did not
reflect when her attorneys received
the notification from TUC. Therefore,
the court reversed and remanded this
issue to the district court.
Cushman next claimed that, under
the VFCRA, TUC did not provide her
with a description of its reinvestigation
procedures as required by Vt. Stat.
Ann. Tit. 9 § 2480d(g)(5). The court
found that the evidence in the record
supported Cushman's claim and ruled
that this claim should stand.
Court Remanded Defamation Claim
Cushman's final claim against
TUC was a state law claim for
defamation. The district court had
dismissed this claim because
Cushman had not produced the
required evidence of malice, and
because the FCRA preempted her
state law claim for defamation except
where "malice with willful intent to
injure" is proven. 15 U.S.C. §
1681 h(e). The court stated that the
district court failed to address this
issue. Accordingly, the court re-
manded Cushman's defamation
claim, reasoning that, since it had
remanded the issue of whether
Cushman was entitled to punitive
damages for her claim of willful
noncompliance with § 168 li(a), it
would also remand this issue to the
district court to make another finding
of "willfulness" with respect to her
defamation claim.
Finally, the court considered the
district court's alternate basis of
dismissal of Cushman's defamation
claim. The district court had dis-
missed Cushman's defamation claim
on the alternate basis that she had not
produced any evidence of publica-
tion. The court used the law of the
forum state, Pennsylvania, when
considering this issue because
neither party had argued that
Vermont law applied. Under
Pennsylvania law, a claim for
defamation must be supported by
evidence that the information was
communicated to at least one person
other than the person defamed.
Disagreeing with the district court,
the appellate court determined that a
jury could find that the information
had been published for two reasons.
First, a TUC employee testified at
trial that the allegedly defamatory
information was communicated to
Citibank and Chase. Second,
Cushman was originally informed of
the allegedly defamatory informa-
tion through a bill collector and the
jury could find that this information
had been published to him. Conse-
quently, the court also reversed and
remanded the district court's
alternate ruling on Cushman's
defamation claim. I
PPO Did Not Violate Antitrust Laws by Canceling
Contract with Area Hospital
By Thomas O'Connor
In Doctor's Hospital of Jefferson,
Inc. v. Southeast MedicalAlliance,
Inc., 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
district court decision granting the
motion for summary judgment made
by Defendant preferred provider
organization ("PPO"), Southwest
Medical Alliance, Inc. ("SMA"), and
Defendant hospital, Jefferson Parish
Hospital Service District No. 2 ("East
Jefferson"). Plaintiff, Doctor's
Hospital of Jefferson, Inc. ("DIJ"),
claimed that Defendants violated 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act
when SMA accepted East Jefferson
into its PPO and contemporaneously
dropped DHJ from its PPO. The
district court granted the motion after
finding that Plaintiff did not have
proper standing to bring an antitrust
suit; the appellate court affirmed, but
on alternate grounds. The appellate
court found that although Plaintiff
had standing to bring an antitrust
claim by alleging that Defendants had
injured Plaintiff's position in the
marketplace, Plaintiff was unable to
show that it suffered an antitrust
injury, and therefore summary
judgment was proper.
East Jefferson Joined SMA, and
DHJ's Membership Was
Simultaneously Terminated
DHJ and East Jefferson are
located next door to each other in
suburban New Orleans and shared a
number of the same doctors. East
Jefferson was the more established of
the two hospitals as it opened in
1968, 16 years earlier than DHJ, and
had more than four times the bed
space of DHJ. In 1988, DHJ and a
number of other hospitals established
SMA, a not-for-profit PPO. SMA
was organized by dividing its member
hospitals into two tiers: (1) member
hospitals which receive seats on
SMA's board of directors and (2)
hospitals on contract to provide
services which retain no ownership of
SMA. At the time SMA was estab-
lished, DIJ began in the more
prestigious of the two tiers, as a
member hospital. However by 1991,
after briefly dropping out of SMA,
DHJ was reaffiliated as a member in
the second tier.
As the number of patients served
by SMA and the revenues earned by
SMA members grew, DHJ attempted
to get back into the potentially more
profitable first tier. However, SMA
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was more interested in having East
Jefferson join the PPO. When East
Jefferson was finally admitted to the
PPO, SMA dropped DIU pursuant to
an escape clause in their contract.
When SMA dropped DHJ, DHJ was
associated with six other PPOs.
In response to being dropped, DIU
sued both SMA and East Jefferson,
claiming that the Defendants
conspired to restrict competition by
excluding DHJ from SMA and
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. DHJ
also claimed that East Jefferson
attempted to monopolize hospital
services in its neighborhood in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
DIJ asserted that East Jefferson used
its market power in the immediate
area to base its entrance in SMA on
DIJ's exclusion from SMA. DIM
asked for damages for its lost profits
of SMA revenues and damage to
DHJ's ability to compete because of
its exclusion from SMA.
District Court Erroneously Granted
Summary Judgment Based on Lack
of Standing
Standing is a prerequisite to
bringing a suit under either § 1 or § 2
of the Sherman Act. Standing to
bring an antitrust suit exists only
when three conditions are met: (1)
plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact
proximately caused by defendant; (2)
the injury was an antitrust injury; and
(3) there is not a party better suited to
bring the suit than the plaintiff."
(citing McCormack v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d
1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1988)). The
district court found that to satisfy the
second prong of the test, a plaintiff
must allege both individual and
market-wide injury to competition.
The district court held that since DIJ
did not properly allege a market-wide
antitrust injury in this case, it did not
have standing to bring suit.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found
that a plaintiff need not allege a
market-wide injury to competition to
have standing, only that a plaintiff
must allege a plaintiff-specific injury
in relation to its position in the
marketplace. In this case, DIJ
alleged that its injury resulted from
SMA and East Jefferson's exclusion-
ary practices. The court held that the
district court's interpretation of
standing was too restrictive, and that
DHJ had showed enough of a
potential antitrust injury to establish
standing. Moreover, the purpose of
the antitrust legislation would be
served by considering the legal
aspects of the claim. Because DHJ
established standing for an antitrust
claim, the only question at issue was
whether the injury constituted an
antitrust injury.
Fifth Circuit Affirmed Grant of
Summary Judgment on Alternative
Grounds
Despite its rejection of the district
court's finding regarding standing,
the appellate court held that the
district court's grant of summary
judgment was proper. DIJ brought
two types of claims under the
Sherman Act. The court ruled that to
prove a § 1 claim, under the reason-
of-rule analysis, a plaintiff must show
that Defendants' actions caused an
injury to competition. To show a § 2
violation, a plaintiff must show that
Defendant attempted to monopolize
a defined market. The court analyzed
both of DHJ's contentions and found
that both claims failed to present
genuine issues of material fact.
DHJ Failed to Show That Its
Exclusion from SMA Harmed
Competition
Because DIM did not allege on
appeal that Defendants' action were
unlawful per se, DIJ had to show
that those actions unreasonably
restrained trade. Specifically, DHJ
had to show that Defendants'
activities, on balance, did more harm
to market competition than good. To
each harm Plaintiff alleged, Defen-
dants responded that their behavior
was justified for the same reasons
that a manufacturer has the absolute
right to choose its distributors. DHJ
responded that unlike a manufac-
turer-distributor relationship, which
involves the manufacturer acting
unilaterally or pursuant to a vertical
agreement with a supplier, SMA
actually facilitated East Jefferson's
horizontal action to restrict trade by
removing DIMI as a competitor.
The court held that no adverse
antitrust consequences result from a
PPO which "prefers" certain provid-
ers. While the manufacturer-distribu-
tor analogy provided useful insight,
the substitution of one distributor for
another should not be expected to
injure competition. Unless the
arrangement between DHJ and SMA
was necessary for DHJ to compete,
there was no antitrust violation by
substituting East Jefferson for DHJ.
The effect of the substitution is
only important when viewed from
DIJ's overall ability to compete, not
when viewed with regard to its
relationship with SMA. The court
found it irrelevant that DIM was
possibly injured by its exclusion
from SMA, that the revenues DIJ
would have received from SMA were
potentially attractive, or that East
Jefferson may have intended to hurt
DHJ. The court referred to the
Department of Justice guidelines that
insisted that the focus of an antitrust
analysis when PPOs are involved
should not be on whether a particular
provider was injured, but whether the
consumer was harmed by a reduction
in competition. The court expanded
this focus to include an analysis of
whether the provider was completely
barred from competition by its
exclusion or only in regard to its
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relationship with the excluding PPO.
In this case, the court found that DHJ
was not injured in the aggregate by
its exclusion from SMA since DHJ
soon affiliated with a larger PPO
after leaving SMA. Furthermore, the
court found that consumers were not
injured because the availability of
health care providers to consumers in
the neighborhood was not reduced.
Court Found Each § 1 Allegation
Lacked Genuine Issues of Material
Fact
Next, DHJ claimed that prices for
hospital services in the market
increased because of Defendants'
antitrust activities. DHJ's expert
economist testified that East
Jefferson's prices were higher than
DIJ's which indicated an antitrust
violation. The court, however,
reasoned that DHJ's expert did not
adequately define East Jefferson's
market power in a meaningful
geographic market. Furthermore, the
court reasoned that price increases
may be indicative of positive aspects
of East Jefferson, such as better
quality services; therefore, DHJ failed
to show that the higher prices were a
direct result of a lack of competition.
DHJ's second § 1 claim was also
rejected by the court. DHJ alleged
that its exclusion from SMA reduced
consumer choice for consumers who
used SMA. The court, however,
found that the number of hospitals
available to patients in general, and
users of SMA in particular, had not
been reduced. The availability of the
hospitals to various customers might
have changed, but any reduction in
hospital availability was insufficient
to decrease market competition.
Furthermore, any price increase that
DHJ was forced to incur due to its
realignment would not eliminate DHJ
as a potential provider to most of its
former SMA patients.
Finally, DIJ's last § 1 complaint
was that it was substantially weak-
ened as a competitor because its
exclusion from SMA caused it to lose
profits and to lose its membership in
a premiere PPO. The court held that,
while injury to a competitor may be
evidence of an injury to market
competition, the specific injury to
DI-IJ was insufficient to create a
factual issue regarding damage to
competition. In fact, DHJ's own
injury was insignificant enough that
its long term viability as a market
competitor was unaffected as it
maintained membership in numerous
managed care plans. Thus, DHJ
showed that it could not compete
without an affiliation with SMA.
Court Rejected the § 2 Claim for
Failure to Properly Define a Market
Next, DHJ claimed damage
resulting from a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act, but this claim also
failed because it did not present a
genuine issue of material fact.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
prevents parties from engaging in
conspiracies to monopolize relevant
markets. To maintain a § 2 claim,
DHJ had to properly define a market
that East Jefferson allegedly was
trying to monopolize. The appellate
court found that DHJ defined its
geographic market too narrowly
because there was too much PPO
patient migration to and from the
market DHJ defined. Thus, the court
concluded that DHJ's § 2 claim
should fail.
In conclusion, although DHJ was
able to establish standing to bring an
antitrust suit, it failed to establish
that there were grounds for such a
suit. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision to
grant Defendants' motion for
summary judgment because Plaintiff
could not present a genuine issue of
material fact to support either its § 1
or § 2 claims.
Medical Device Amendments Act Does Not Preempt All
State Law Claims
by Brad Kenneth Lindow
In Mitchell v. Collagen Corp.,
126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, on remand from
the Supreme Court of the United
States, reconsidered its prior holding
in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67
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F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995), that the
Medical Device Amendments
("MDA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k, to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95,
preempted some of Plaintiffs' state
law claims. The Supreme Court
remanded the Mitchells' case and
instructed the Seventh Circuit to
reconsider its prior ruling in light of
the ruling in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996). Upon doing so,
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the
judgment of the district court
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